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Abstract
When alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where 
and how much to trade. We conducted an experiment where traders decided first 
whether to trade in an (efficient) double-auction institution or in a posted-offers 
one (favoring sellers), and second how much to trade. When sellers face decreasing 
returns to scale (increasing production costs), fast coordination on the double-auc-
tion occurs, with the posted-offers institution becoming inactive. In contrast, under 
constant returns to scale, both institutions remain active and coordination is slower. 
The reason is that sellers trade off higher efficiency in a market with dwindling prof-
its for biased-up profits in a market with vanishing customers. Hence, efficiency 
alone might not be sufficient to guarantee coordination on a single market institution 
if the surplus distribution is asymmetric. Trading behavior approaches equilibrium 
predictions (market clearing) within each institution, but switching behavior across 
institutions is explained by simple rules of thumb, with buyers chasing low prices 
and sellers considering both prices and trader ratios.
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1 Introduction
When investigating the functioning of markets one is puzzled by the huge variety of 
market institutions used to trade similar or even the same good (see e.g. Madhavan 
1992; Quan 1994; Zumpano et al. 1996). Extensive research has revealed that the 
institutional rules governing trade have a substantial impact on prices, quantities, 
and the resulting efficiency of markets (see, among many others, Lucking-Reiley 
2000; Reynolds and Wooders 2009; Ariely et al. 2005; Ausubel et al. 2014; Genes-
ove and Hansen 2016). This in turn led to substantial research on the evolution of 
market rules (see e.g. Rud and Rabanal 2018). Starting with the seminal contribu-
tion of Hayek (1967) it has been argued that traders, if left to their own devices, 
choose the most efficient trading institution that the good at hand allows for.1 This 
article aims to test this conjecture experimentally. Specifically, we set out to inves-
tigate whether efficient institutions are indeed used in the long run, while inefficient 
ones fade as they are eventually avoided by the traders.
Take a situation where different trading platforms are feasible for trading a par-
ticular good. Each trader has to choose which one he/she wants to use.2 An indi-
vidual buyer or seller will not choose a platform where he/she cannot find a trading 
partner, even if the institutional setup of the avoided platform would lead to very 
efficient trading outcomes. Hence, traders face a (partial) coordination game when 
choosing on which platform they want to trade.3 After choosing the trading institu-
tion, i.e. for a given distribution of buyers and sellers over the feasible platforms, the 
institutional setups–together with demand and supply resulting from the platform 
choice–will lead to more or less efficient trading outcomes. Hence, the whole pro-
cess is characterized by two steps: First, traders have to choose the trading platform 
(where to trade). Then, they conduct their trades with the partners available at their 
platform (how much and at which price to trade).
In our experiment each subject is either a buyer or a seller. In the first stage of 
each experimental round, each subject had to choose individually between a posted 
offer (PO; with sellers posting prices) institution and an open double auction (DA, 
Plott and Gray 1990; “open” meaning that there was no auctioneer, thus multiple 
prices could be realized).4 In the second stage of each round, subjects could trade 
multiple units of a homogeneous good according to the rules of the chosen institu-
tion with those potential trading partners who had opted for the same institution. 
At the end of each round, all the participants received aggregate information about 
what happened at both institutions, enabling them to make an informed decision 
on where to trade in the next round: number of buyers and sellers, distribution of 
1 This “Hayekian” position can also be discerned in the writings of Klein and Alchian (1978) and Wil-
liamson (1975).
2 In our notation sellers are female and buyers are male.
3 Coordination games have been widely studied both theoretically and experimentally (see, e.g. Young 
1993; Van Huyck et al. 1997). To the best of our knowledge, though, these investigations have not been 
connected to the functioning of markets.
4 We speak of “market institutions” for consistency with the previous literature. Other authors have used 
the term “market formats” (e.g. Rud and Rabanal 2018).
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trading prices (and their average), and number of trades per buyer and per seller at 
each institution. Then a new round started, where first all subjects had to choose 
between the DA and the PO. After that, they traded on the chosen platform anew, 
received information about the outcome of both institutions, and so on.
For each trade conducted, the seller received the price paid by the buyer, but 
in turn she had to pay production costs that were determined by the experimental 
design. Hence, her net earnings from a trade were the difference between the price 
and production costs. For a buyer, the net earnings from a trade were the difference 
between the resale values, which were determined by the design of the experiment, 
and the price paid.5 That is, in each given round, the actual, endogenously-induced 
supply and demand at a given platform was determined by the production costs 
and resale values of the sellers and buyers who opted for that platform. To keep the 
demand and supply functions constant, and since our focus is on which institutions 
survive, the induced values were the same for all buyers and the production costs 
were the same for all sellers.
We chose DA and PO as institutional alternatives since it is very well docu-
mented that, when functioning in isolation, DAs are highly efficient, whereas POs 
tend to create inefficiencies and are biased towards sellers. Theoretically, for exam-
ple, Rustichini et al. (1994) show that, in double auctions, possible inefficiencies due 
to traders’ strategic misreporting vanish quickly as the number of traders increase. 
Empirically, it has been repeatedly shown that DAs induce a very quick convergence 
of prices and quantities to market clearing levels (see, e.g., the seminal article of 
Plott and Smith 1978a). As a consequence, the DA has been found to be the most 
efficient market institution when efficiency is measured by the sum of all gains from 
trade reaped by buyers and sellers (as it is usually done in the context of market 
experiments). In fact, DA is routinely used in market experiments as a proxy for 
competitive markets (e.g., Plott 2000; Crockett et al. 2011; Gillen et al. 2020). On 
the other hand, in the PO prices and quantities typically show a much slower con-
vergence to the market clearing level, with prices typically converging from above 
(see Plott and Smith 1978a). For given demand and supply, the efficiency level is 
considerably higher for a DA than for a PO. If efficiency drives the selection of mar-
ket institutions, we should expect that traders coordinate on the DA, and that the PO 
eventually falls into disuse.
The experimental results indicate that the validity of this prediction depends 
crucially on the properties of the distribution of production costs. If the produc-
tion technology underlying the sellers’ supply function exhibits decreasing returns 
to scale, traders indeed learn to coordinate on the efficient DA, with PO becom-
ing mostly inactive in finitely many rounds. In contrast, if production displays con-
stant returns to scale, resulting in a flat induced supply function, coordination on DA 
5 In order to obtain a decreasing demand function allowing for an unambiguous equilibrium prediction, 
the highest resale value was used for the calculation of the net earnings of the buyer’s first trade, the sec-
ond highest resale value for the calculation of the earnings resulting from the second trade, etc.
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happens more slowly and both institutions remain active until the last round.6 This 
difference might be caused by the fact that a Pareto-dominance relation between the 
two institutions depends on the distribution of the production costs. For a produc-
tion technology with constant returns to scale, sellers’ earnings are (nearly) zero at 
an institution like the DA that induces prices which are at (or very close to) the 
market clearing level. Hence, one market side, i.e. the sellers, has a strong incentive 
to try to coordinate traders on an institution like the PO, where prices are above the 
market clearing level. To put it differently, if an institution yields outcomes which 
Pareto-dominate those of competing ones, it should be expected that it will clearly 
and quickly drive the latter out of the market. However, switching from coordination 
on the less efficient PO to coordination on the more efficient DA does not constitute 
a Pareto-improvement if sellers produce under constant returns to scale. Our results 
thus suggest that efficiency alone, as measured by the sum of the gains from trade, 
might not be enough to guarantee that a market institution drives competing ones 
out of the field. The reason for this is that sellers face a tradeoff between a more effi-
cient institution which brings their profits down and an inefficient, low-volume one 
which however typically yields higher prices. In the absence of Pareto-dominance, 
the distribution of gains from trade, and not only aggregate efficiency, becomes con-
sequential for market selection and survival.7
Our data allows us to look both at actual trading behavior within an institution 
and the previous decision of which institution to trade in. Regarding the former, we 
observe that aggregate behavior, as reflected by actual prices, does converge to the 
theoretical market-clearing benchmark both in PO and in DA (even though we use 
an open DA implementation without an auctioneer). Regarding the choice of market 
institution, we find that simple rules of thumb are sufficient to capture most behav-
ior. Buyers seem to mostly chase after low (past) prices, switching to the institution 
where observed prices were better for them, along the lines of previously-postulated 
behavioral rules based on past performance only (e.g. Huck et al. 1999; Offerman 
et  al. 2002; Bosch-Domènech and Vriend 2003). Sellers’ behavior appears to be 
more complex, but is well-explained by the combination of a similar rule which 
points toward high prices, and a complementary rule which focuses on favorable 
trader ratios. In our setting, where all buyers have the same resale values and all 
7 Naturally, one could also consider a mirror-image situation where the inefficient institution favors buy-
ers, e.g. using a posted-bid institution (PB) where buyers post bids. By symmetry we would expect sym-
metric results to the ones obtained for the choice between the DA and PO: If the demand is perfectly 
elastic and supply is increasing, the market-side “disadvantaged” by the market clearing equilibrium (in 
this case the buyers) would resist full coordination on the DA, and the PB would remain active. On the 
other hand, for decreasing demand and increasing supply we would also expect full coordination on the 
DA. One could expect this convergence to be even faster when the supply is perfectly elastic. Finally, if 
the choice is between DA and PO, but the demand is perfectly elastic and the supply is increasing, we 
would also expect a very quick convergence to DA since the inefficient institution does not favor the dis-
advantaged side in this case.
6 This result is similar in flavor to those of Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2015, 2017). In these theoreti-
cal articles we found that traders who have to learn which platform to use are more likely to coordinate 
on a market clearing institution if sellers have an increasing supply function. See also Alós-Ferrer et al. 
(2010) for implications for market design.
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sellers have the same cost functions, equilibrium prices are a function of trader 
ratios, hence the latter rule might reflect forward-looking behavior.
An extensive experimental literature, going back to Chamberlin (1948) and 
Smith (1962), has analyzed the empirical properties of market institutions for given 
demand and supply when viewed in isolation (for an overview see Plott and Smith 
1978b, Part 1).8 Surprisingly, however, very few contributions have combined the 
experimental investigation of actual trading behavior with the analysis of the choice 
of the trading institution for a given good. One notable exception is Campbell et al. 
(1991), which investigated the endogenous choice between a computerized double-
auction market (with an auctioneer) and (illegal) off-floor trading in the context of 
stock markets, and its impact on the bid-ask spread. The latter was implemented as 
direct negotiations, specifically traders could submit direct offers for blocks of three 
units to their two neighboring traders of the other market side. Kugler et al. (2006) 
compare direct negotiations and centralized markets in an experimental setting 
where each trader can trade a single unit only. Trade can be conducted in two alter-
native institutions. The first captures centralized markets through a sealed-bid double 
auction with a single market clearing price (as in Campbell et al. 1991, computed by 
an auctioneer). The second captures direct negotiations through bilateral matching, 
where the matching was designed as to maximize trade. Inefficiency might appear 
due to asymmetric distribution of traders across the two institutions, but their focus 
was not on the comparison of institutions in terms of efficiency. Rather, they focus 
on heterogeneous traders with different values and find that different types of traders 
generally prefer different market mechanisms. Their results show an unraveling of 
direct negotiations, which is led by higher-value traders (buyers with high resale val-
ues or sellers with low costs), who learn faster to coordinate on the centralized mar-
ket. Last, the theoretical work of Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2015) included an 
experiment on platform selection but adopted a reduced-form payoff table for actual 
trade, that is, traders did not make actual trading decisions. Alós-Ferrer and Kirch-
steiger (2015) focused on the selection of market-clearing institutions (vs. institu-
tions with price biases) and showed that certain alternative institutions could survive 
in the long run when players followed simple behavioral rules of thumb.
2  The experiment
A total of N = 480 subjects (258 females, mean age 25.3 years, SD = 6.9 ) partici-
pated in 15 experimental sessions. Subjects were recruited from the student pop-
ulation of the University of Cologne (excluding students majoring in psychology) 
via ORSEE (Greiner 2015). All interactions took place via a custom-made market 
interface (see Sect. 2.2) programmed in zTree (Fischbacher 2007). There were two 
treatments, DRS and CRS (see Sect. 2.3), with 15 groups (240 subjects) randomly 
assigned to each of them and to the buyer or seller role (see Table 1).
8 Williams et al. (2000) examined experimental double-auction markets in a setting where participants 
traded two different goods concurrently, with a different market for each good.
 C. Alós-Ferrer et al.
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2.1  Procedures
A session comprised 32 subjects randomly allocated into two groups of 16 subjects 
each. Subjects interacted only with other subjects within their own group. That is, 
each group constitutes an independent observation. Within each group half of the 
subjects were randomly assigned the role of a buyer and half were assigned the role 
of a seller. Roles remained fixed throughout the experiment.
Before the beginning of the experiment, subjects received written instructions 
describing the course of the experiment and the market selection stage (see Online 
Appendix). These general instructions were also read aloud by the experimenter. 
After that, subjects received specific written instructions according to their assigned 
role (buyer or seller) with a detailed description of how trade was conducted at each 
of the two platforms. Subjects then answered four control questions to ensure their 
understanding of the experimental environment.
The instructions also contained a detailed description of the payment procedure, 
which was carried out truthfully. At the end of the experiment a subject’s earnings 
from each round were added up and converted to euros at a rate of €1.5 for 100 
experimental currency units. In addition subjects received a show up fee of €4 lead-
ing to an average total remuneration of 23.68 EUR. Sessions lasted about 105 min-
utes on average.
2.2  Design and market interface
Each population of traders consisted of 8 buyers and 8 sellers. Roles were assigned 
randomly at the beginning of the experiment and stayed fixed throughout. All mar-
ket interactions took place via a custom-made interface programmed in zTree (Fis-
chbacher 2007).9 There were 25 trading rounds, each consisting of two sequential 
stages. In the first stage (Market Selection), each trader chose individually between 
two market platforms, a double auction (DA) and a posted offer (PO) institution. In 
the second stage (Trading), subjects could trade at the selected platform according to 
the rules of that institution, interacting with all traders who selected the same mar-
ket. That is, the number of traders within each market was determined endogenously 
and, hence, so was demand and supply. The number of buyers and sellers within the 
selected market was visible throughout the trading stage. In any given round traders 
had to commit to the selected market and could only trade within that market, but 
they could freely switch markets between rounds.
We use a multi-unit setup, specifically, each trader can trade up to 6 units of a 
homogeneous good. Buyers received exogenously-given resale values for each 
unit bought. Sellers faced exogenously-given production costs for each unit sold.10 
10 In this sense, preferences in our experiment were induced. Crockett et al. (2020) make the point that, 
in market experiments where traded goods involve exogenous risk, it might be important to differenti-
ate between induced and elicited preferences. However, the trading stage of our experiment involved no 
exogenous risk and followed the tradition of Chamberlin (1948), Smith (1962), and many others.
9 See the Online Appendix for screenshots.
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Buyers and sellers were homogeneous, that is, resale values and production costs 
were the same for all buyers and sellers, respectively. For each trade conducted, the 
seller received the price at which the trade took place and had to pay the correspond-
ing production costs, whereas buyers had to pay the price and received the corre-
sponding resale value. Endowments and capacities were reset each period, that is, 
the experiment involved stationary repetition as standard in market experiments.
In each session, the trading rounds were preceded by two trial rounds intended 
to give subjects the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the interface and the 
rules of trade at both platforms. The trial periods featured no market selection stage. 
Instead, in the first trial round 4 buyers and 4 sellers were randomly assigned to each 
platform, and in the second trial round platform allocation was reversed.
Market Selection In the first stage, traders chose between a DA and a PO insti-
tution. In all but the first round, subjects received aggregate information regarding 
the performance of both platforms (irrespective of which platform they had selected 
previously) as well as a summary of their own performance in the previous round. 
Specifically, aggregate information was presented in a table showing the number of 
buyers and sellers, the average trading price, and the number of trades per buyer 
and seller separately for each institution. Additionally, subjects were provided with 
a price-quantity histogram for each market indicating the number of units traded at 
each price. Own performance was summarized via a second table listing the prices 
of all units traded by the subject and the overall profit in that trading round. On the 
same screen subjects then could choose one of the two platforms, neutrally labeled 
“Market A” and “Market B,” via a button press. Subjects had 30 seconds for this 
choice and the remaining time was shown on screen. If a subject failed to select a 
platform within the time limit, he/she could not trade in the next trading round.11 
If in a given round a platform was selected only by buyers or only by sellers, it 
remained inactive and traders were informed of this fact on screen.
Double auction institution Figure 1 displays a graphical illustration of the inter-
face for DA (for buyers). In DA all traders could simultaneously make offers and 
accept open offers by traders from the other market side. That is, there was no auc-
tioneer or market-maker, and all offers were visible for all traders. Traders could 
offer any number of units q ∈ {1,… , q
r
} , with q
r
≤ 6 being the remaining number 
of units that could be traded, at any price p by submitting an offer of the form (p, q), 
subject to the constraint of not incurring a net loss within a trading period.12 At any 
Table 1  Summary of the 
experiment




DRS 120 120 15 8 8
CRS 120 120 15 8 8
11 This happened for 22 of the 480 × 25 market-selection decisions, i.e. around 0.2% of the time.
12 The range of feasible offers that could be submitted and the feasible active offers that could be 
accepted by each trader were limited in such a way that net within-period losses were not possible. That 
is, single units could be traded at a loss as long as this was compensated by profits from other trades in 
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point in time a trader could have at most one active offer. However, offers could be 
withdrawn or replaced by new offers at any time. A submitted offer remained active 
until it was withdrawn or replaced by a new offer. Further, traders could always 
accept active offers by the other market side. All traders could see all open offers 
from both buyers and sellers (see Figure 1). Offers from the own and the other mar-
ket side were always shown on the left and right parts of the screen, respectively. 
Each offer (p,  q) was represented by q boxes showing the price p with each box 
representing an offer to buy/sell one unit at that price (see Figure 1). Traders could 
accept offers from the other market side, that is buy/sell one unit at the shown price, 
by clicking on the corresponding box. Traded units were indicated by crossed-out 
boxes and remained visible until the end of the trading round. Each subject could 
trade up to a maximum of 6 units and the remaining number of units that could be 
traded at any point was shown on screen. Additionally, buyers, respectively sellers, 
were shown the resale values, respectively production costs, for each of the six units 
as well as the price of already-traded units. Subjects could leave the trading stage 
by pressing the “leave market stage” button, in which case any still-active offer was 
withdrawn. The maximum duration of a trading round at DA was 90 seconds, with 
the remaining time shown on screen. Alternatively, the market platform was closed 
if no further trade was possible (for example because all buyers had left the trading 
stage or all sellers were out of stock).
Our design follows the classical Multiple Unit Double Auction (MUDA) design 
of Plott and Gray (1990), with the exception that in their design only the highest-
price bid and the lowest-price ask are shown (replacing previous ones), while in our 
design subjects observe all offers. Subjects were able to see all transactions in real-
time, but no graphical representation or order book were provided.
Posted offer institution In PO buyers and sellers moved sequentially in two dis-
tinct stages. In the first stage, sellers simultaneously submitted offers of the form 
(p, q) proposing to sell q units at price p.13 Each seller was only able to submit a 
single offer (p, q) (similarly to DA, where each trader could have at most one active 
offer at any point in time). Sellers were shown their production costs for all six units, 
but received no information about the offers made by other sellers during this stage. 
This first stage lasted for a maximum of 20 seconds, or, alternatively until all sell-
ers had committed to an offer. At the end of this stage the offers made by all sellers 
were collected and the second stage began. In that stage, buyers moved sequentially 
in a randomly-determined order. When a buyer’s turn came, he observed all offers 
made in the first stage, as well as all units bought by previous buyers, and could buy 
units by clicking on still-available offers. As in the DA case, available offers were 
indicated by numbered boxes and already-traded units by crossed-out boxes (as in 
Footnote 12 (continued)
the same trading period. Subjects received a detailed explanation of this procedure in the written instruc-
tions.
13 As in the DA, feasible offers were limited to (p, q) pairs such that, if all offered units were traded, no 
net within-period loss for the seller would result.
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the right part of Fig. 1).14 A buyer’s turn ended after 20 seconds or once no further 
units were available. The trading round ended once all buyers had had their turn, or 
no further units were available.
2.3  Treatments
In a given round, the resale values and production costs of the traders that opted for 
a particular institution determined the induced supply and demand at that institution. 
There were two treatments, DRS and CRS, which correspond to decreasing and con-
stant returns to scale for the supply side of the market, respectively. Specifically, the 
treatments differed in the resale values and production costs as given in Table 2.15 In 
both treatments the demand function induced via buyers’ resale values was decreas-
ing in the price. This was accomplished by setting decreasing resale values for each 
unit traded by a buyer. In treatment DRS, sellers faced increasing production costs 
(decreasing returns to scale), hence the induced supply function was increasing in 
the price. In treatment CRS, sellers faced a constant production cost instead (con-
stant returns to scale), and as a consequence the induced supply function was flat. 
In each round a common shock X
t
 was added to all these baseline resale values and 
production costs, so that the exact numbers varied from round to round, but induced 
demand and supply were unaffected.
2.4  Hypotheses
Given demand and supply, the DA typically leads to higher efficiency than the PO. 
Intuitively, if selection of market institutions is driven only by efficiency, over time 
traders should learn to coordinate on the efficient institution. However, efficiency is 
only concerned with overall trader surplus but not with the distribution of these gains 
Your bids
50 50 50
Bids by other buyers
Buyer 1 46 46
Buyer 2 42
Buyer 3 47 47 47 47
Buyer 4 56 56 56
Buyer 5 60 60 60 60 60
Open asks by sellers
Seller 1 65
Seller 2 61 61 61 61 61
Seller 3 55 55 55
Seller 4 58 58 58 58
Fig. 1  Schematic representation of the screen layout for DA (buyers)
15 The trial periods used different resale values and production costs.
14 Similarly to the DA case, buyers could only accept offers not leading to a net within-period loss.
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from trade between buyers and sellers. The latter introduces a tradeoff between effi-
ciency and profits for one market-side that could prevent coordination on the efficient 
institution.
In treatment DRS, the distribution of profits is “symmetric” in the sense that for 
prices at the market clearing level both buyers and sellers make positive profits. Con-
sequently, in this treatment the aforementioned tradeoff is expected to be absent and 
convergence on the efficient institution should occur.
Hypothesis 1 In DRS, traders learn to coordinate on DA over time with PO becom-
ing mostly inactive in the final rounds.
In contrast, treatment CRS presents exactly an “asymmetric” setting where market 
power is biased toward buyers in the sense that at prices at the market clearing level 
sellers make zero profits and buyers reap all the gains from trade. Hence, sellers have 
to choose between an efficient institution where their profits are (close to) zero and an 
inefficient institution which, due to its structure, typically leads to higher prices and 
seller profits. This tradeoff might hinder coordination on DA leading to slower conver-
gence and survival of the inefficient PO institution.
Hypothesis 2 In CRS, coordination on DA is slower than in DRS with both institu-
tions remaining active until the last round.
3  Equilibrium prices and market‑clearing benchmark
In this section, we consider the theoretical benchmark where markets clear, taking as 
given an allocation of traders to institutions, and derive equilibrium market prices and 
total trader surplus, which we will use as a benchmark to measure efficiency.
Fix an institution, and consider the population of traders that has chosen to 
trade at that institution. This population consists of n buyers and m sellers (with 
n, m ∈ {0,… , 8} in the experiment). Each trader can trade up to Q units ( Q = 6 
in the experiment) of a single homogeneous good. Denote the price of the good by 
p ≥ 0 . A typical buyer is characterized by a vector of resale values (r1,… , rQ) with 
r
1
≥ ⋯ ≥ rQ > 0 where rk is the buyer’s resale value for the kth unit. A typical seller is 
characterized by a vector of production costs (c1,… , cQ) with 0 < c1 ≤ ⋯ ≤ cQ where 
c
k




 , that is, beneficial 
trade is possible for any p ∈ [r1, c1] . For a given price p, the resale values induce a 
(weakly) decreasing demand function given by
That is, demand is given by the largest number of units that the n buyers are will-
ing to purchase (implicitly assuming, for simplicity, that traders are willing to trade 
when exactly indifferent). Specifically, if rQ < p < r1 , k is the unique number such 
that rk+1 < p ≤ rk . If p ≤ rQ , then k = Q and demand is given by nQ (the capacity 
constraint becomes binding). If p > r
1
 , the set over which the supremum is taken 
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above is empty (so the supremum is formally −∞ ), and hence k = 0 and demand is 
nonexistent. The induced demand function is illustrated in Fig. 2 for both treatments 
in the experiment, for the case where all 8 buyers are at the same institution.
Analogously, for a given price p, the production costs induce a (weakly) increas-
ing supply function given by
That is, supply is given by the largest number of units that the m sellers are willing 
to sell. Specifically, if c
1
< p < cQ , k is the unique number such that ck ≤ p < ck+1 . 
If p ≥ cQ , then k = Q and supply is given by mQ (the capacity constraint becomes 
binding). If p < c
1
 , k = 0 and supply is nonexistent. The induced supply function is 
illustrated in Fig. 2 for both treatments in the experiment, for the case where all 8 
sellers are at the same institution.
In our discrete setting, demand and supply are step functions and hence equi-
librium prices might correspond to an interval instead of a unique value. Let 
p(m, n) = sup{p ∣ d(n, p) ≥ s(m, p)} and p̄(m, n) = inf{p ∣ d(n, p) ≤ s(m, p)} . It fol-
lows that p(m, n) ∈ {−∞, c1,… , cQ} and p̄(m, n) ∈ {+∞, r1,… , rQ} . Further, note 




 , at least one of p̄(m, n) and p(m, n) must be 
finite.
The set of equilibrium prices p∗(m, n) is given by
Figure 2 illustrates p∗(m, n) for both treatments in the experiment, for the particu-
lar case m = n = 8 . Note that p̄(m, n) = ∞ implies that n ≥ mQ and demand always 
exceeds supply, hence r
1
 is the unique equilibrium price at which trade actually 
occurs. Analogously, if p(m, n) = −∞ , m ≥ nQ , supply always exceeds demand, and 
c
1
 is the unique equilibrium price at which trade occurs.
In our experiment, the resale values were given, and the production costs varied 
across treatments (DRS and CRS). Tables B.1 and B.2 in the Online Appendix report 
the equilibrium price intervals for both treatments. In the analysis below, and as a first 













[p(m, n), p̄(m, n)] if p(m, n), p̄(m, n) are finite
{r1} if p̄(m, n) = ∞ (that is, n ≥ mQ)
{c1} if p(m, n) = −∞ (that is, m ≥ nQ).
Table 2  Baseline resale values 
and production costs for 
treatments DRS and CRS
Unit DRS CRS
Resale Values Costs Resale Values Costs
1 80 15 80 40
2 65 35 65 40
3 60 40 60 40
4 55 50 55 40
5 40 60 40 40
6 35 65 35 40
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measure of the efficiency of the institution, we will report the distance from actually-
realized trading prices per round to the benchmark equilibrium price intervals p∗(m, n).
As a second measure of efficiency, we consider the largest achievable total trader 
surplus for a given number of buyers and sellers. Let the mQ resale values of the m 
buyers be R
1
≥ ⋯ ≥ RmQ and let the nQ costs of the sellers be C1 ≤ ⋯ ≤ CnQ . The 
maximum gains of trade are defined as the largest-possible total trader surplus, that 
is
Figure 2 illustrates S∗(m, n) for both treatments in the experiment, for the particular 
case m = n = 8 . The values of S∗(m, n) for DRS and CRS are given in Tables B.3 
and B.4 in the Online Appendix, respectively. In the analysis below, we will com-
pare the actually-realized total trader surplus (defined as the sum of the differences 
between resale value and production cost for all actually-traded units) to S∗(m, n).
4  Results: Market Selection
4.1  Decreasing returns
We first consider treatment DRS, where the supply side faced decreasing returns 
to scale ( N = 240 in 15 market observations). The top-left panel of Figure 3 shows 




(Ri − Ci) where I =
{
i || Ri > Ci, i ≤ min{nQ, mQ}
}
.












































Fig. 2  Induced demand and supply functions for both treatments (DRS left, CRS right) in case of full 
coordination on the respective institution
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convergence toward DA over time.16 That is, as time goes by, more and more traders 
of each market side choose the DA. This is confirmed in a series of linear random 
effects regressions on the number of buyers/sellers at DA per period, as reported in 
Table 3.17 The variable RatioDA is the (lagged) buyer-seller ratio at DA. The regres-
sions show that buyers are attracted by a low buyer-sellers ratio, but the latter has no 
effect on sellers’ behavior.
The bottom-left panel of Fig. 3 shows the fraction of markets where DA and PO 
are active over time. Across all 15 markets the DA is active in all but one period for 
a single market, that is, on average the DA is active 99.7% of the time. In contrast, 
the PO is only active 48% of the time. The average fraction of periods in which 
DA is active is significantly larger than the average fraction of periods in which PO 
is active (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, WSR: N = 15,18 z = 3.352 , p < 0.001 ). We 
obtain a similar result for the average number of buyers or sellers, that is, on average 
there are more buyers and more sellers at DA than at PO (WSR, buyers: z = 3.352 , 
p < 0.001 ; sellers: z = 3.352 , p < 0.001).
To confirm that traders increasingly coordinate on DA over time, we compare 
coordination at the beginning against coordination at the end of the experiment. To 
that end, we exclude the first period and split the remaining 24 periods in three parts 
of 8 periods each (see the Online Appendix for an alternative specification). We first 
consider the fraction of time DA or PO are active in part 1 vs. part 3. Because DA is 
essentially active in all periods, there is no difference for DA between parts 1 and 3 
(WSR, z = −1.000 , p = 0.317 ). On the other hand, PO is active more often in part 
1 (64.2% of the time) than in part 3 (28.3%; WSR, z = 3.048 , p = 0.002 ). A similar 
picture emerges when looking at the number of buyers and sellers at DA, which is 
significantly larger at the end of the experiment compared to the beginning (WSR, 
buyers: z = −3.311 , p < 0.001 ; sellers: z = −3.411 , p < 0.001).
4.2  Constant returns
We now consider treatment CRS ( N = 240 in 15 different market observations). The 
top-right panel of Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the number of buyers and sell-
ers at DA over the course of the experiment in CRS. We again observe convergence 
toward DA, although it appears to be slower than in the case of DRS (see next sub-
section for a treatment comparison).19 Table  4 displays a series of linear random 
effects regressions of the number of buyers/sellers at DA on period and shows that 
traders move toward DA over time.20 Buyers are attracted by a low buyer-seller ratio, 
and the opposite is true for sellers.
19 Figure A.2 in the Online Appendix displays the analogous graphs for each market session.
20 Fractional logit regressions yield the same results. See Table A.2 in the Online Appendix.
16 Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix displays the analogous graphs for each market session.
17 Fractional logit regressions yield the same results. See Table A.1 in the Online Appendix.
18 All WSR tests in Sects.  4 and 5 refer to paired comparisons within a treatment and hence have 
N = 15 . Thus, we omit the number of observations below.
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The bottom-right panel of Figure 3 shows the fraction of markets in CRS where 
DA and PO are active over time. DA is always active, whereas PO is only active 
66.4% of the time, which is significantly less often than DA (WSR: z = 3.333 , 

































































































Fig. 3  Top: Average (over 15 markets) number of buyers/sellers at DA per period for DRS (left) and 
CRS (right). Bottom: Average (over 15 markets) fraction of markets where DA/PO is active per period 
for DRS (left) and CRS (right)
Table 3  Linear random effects 
regressions for DRS
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ 
p < 0.01
Number of buyers at DA Number of sellers at 
DA
1 2 3 4
Period 0.0734∗∗∗ 0.0636∗∗∗ 0.0959∗∗∗ 0.0864∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0088) (0.0090)
RatioDA −0.5988∗∗∗ 0.1776
(0.1308) (0.1373)
Constant 5.8000∗∗∗ 6.5959∗∗∗ 5.3580∗∗∗ 5.3413∗∗∗
(0.3470) (0.2954) (0.3790) (0.3387)
R
2 (overall) 0.1193 0.1652 0.1663 0.1194
Observations 375 359 375 359
Markets 15 15 15 15
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more buyers and more sellers at DA (WSR, buyers: z = 3.352 , p < 0.001 ; sellers: 
z = 3.352 , p < 0.001).
As in the previous treatment, we compare coordination in parts 1 (periods 2–9) 
and 3 (periods 18–25). We first consider the fraction of time DA or PO are active in 
part 1 vs part 3 of CRS. Because in CRS DA is always active in all periods, there 
is no difference for this platform. On the other hand, PO is active more often in 
part 1 (78.3% of the time) than in part 3 (59.2%; WSR, z = 2.094 , p = 0.036 ). The 
analogous statement holds for the number of buyers and sellers at DA, which is sig-
nificantly larger in part 1 compared to part 3 (WSR, buyers: z = −3.401 , p < 0.001 ; 
sellers: z = −2.902 , p = 0.004).
4.3  Treatment comparison
We now compare the results of treatment CRS with those of the DRS treatment. 
Examination of Figure 3 suggests that convergence toward coordination on DA is 
slower in the case of constant returns to scale. A treatment comparison shows that, 
indeed, there are on average more buyers and more sellers at DA in DRS than in 
CRS (Mann-Whitney-U test, MWU, buyers: N = 30,21 z = 1.660 , p = 0.097 ; sell-
ers: z = 2.158 , p = 0.031).22
The differences are also reflected in the comparison between the beginning and 
the end of the experiment. Although there is no difference in activity for DA or PO 
in part 1 (MWU, DA: z = −1.000 , p = 0.317 ; PO: z = −1.272 , p = 0.204 ), in part 3 
PO is marginally more active in CRS than in DRS (MWU, z = −1.721 , p = 0.085 ). 
Table 4  Linear random effects 
regressions for CRS
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ 
p < 0.01
Number of buyers at DA Number of sellers at 
DA
1 2 3 4
Period 0.0882∗∗∗ 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.0622∗∗∗ 0.0548∗∗∗
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0101) (0.0107)
RatioDA −0.5331∗∗∗ 0.3603∗∗
(0.1127) (0.1558)
Constant 5.1153∗∗∗ 5.7994∗∗∗ 5.0507∗∗∗ 4.7695∗∗∗
(0.3315) (0.2999) (0.3159) (0.3279)
R
2 (overall) 0.1629 0.1870 0.0715 0.0495
Observations 375 360 375 360
Markets 15 15 15 15
21 All MWU tests in sects. 4 and 5 refer to comparisons across treatments and hence have N = 30 . Thus, 
we omit the number of observations below.
22 PO is also active more often in CRS (66.4% of the time) than in DRS (48.0%), but the difference fails 
to reach significance (MWU, z = −1.519 , p = 0.129).
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Activity is, however, a somewhat coarse measure, hence we turn to the number 
of buyers and sellers at DA as a more fine-grained measure of convergence. With 
this measure, we find that already at the beginning of the experiment more buyers 
and sellers coordinate on DA in DRS compared to CRS (MWU; buyers, z = 1.787 , 
p = 0.074 ; sellers, z = 1.808 , p = 0.071 ). The difference subsists at the end of the 
experiment (buyers, z = 1.660 , p = 0.097 ; sellers, z = 2.926 , p = 0.003).
Table 5 displays the results of linear regressions comparing the number of buy-
ers and sellers in the first and last parts of the experiment (rounds 2-9 and 18-25, 
respectively) across treatments. That is, the dummy CRS takes the value 1 for mar-
ket observations in that treatment. We observe that the number of sellers at DA is 
significantly smaller for CRS market observations, but only in part 3.23 
5  Results: Efficiency and the Gains from Trade
The previous section has concentrated on the market selection decision and shown 
that traders learn to gradually coordinate on the DA platform, although convergence 
is stronger under decreasing returns to scale. This section examines trading deci-
sions within each institution, and asks whether actual trade is efficient and which 
market side is able to reap larger shares of the gains from trade.
5.1  Trading Efficiency and Market‑Clearing
We consider two dimensions of efficiency of an institution. The first is the differ-
ence between the actual price and the equilibrium price interval p∗(m, n) given that 
n buyers and m sellers are currently present at that institution. The second is the 
fraction of realized gains (trader surplus) relative to the maximal possible gains of 
trade S∗(m, n).
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the average price at both institutions relative to 
the equilibrium price, for both treatments. For illustrative purposes, what is plotted 
is the difference p − p∗ , where p is the realized average price and p∗ is the equilib-
rium price, if the latter is unique. If p∗(m, n) is a proper interval, we plot the differ-
ence with the closest value in that interval.
To evaluate how close realized prices were to equilibrium ones, we consider the 
distance, i.e. the (average across markets of the) absolute value of the average differ-
ence each period. In DRS, realized prices where closer to equilibrium in DA (aver-
age distance 2.86) than in PO (9.45; WSR, z = −3.294 , p < 0.001 ). This is also true 
in CRS, although the difference is smaller. In this treatment, the average distance 
between realized and equilibrium prices was 7.20 for DA and 9.25 for PO (WSR, 
z = −2.499 , p = 0.013 ). Comparing treatments, for DA the distance to equilibrium 
prices is larger in CRS than in DRS (MWU, z = −4.500 , p < 0.001 ), whereas we 
find no significant difference across treatments for PO ( z = 0.477 , p = 0.633).
23 Fractional logit regressions yield the same results. See Table A.3 in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 5 displays the evolution of the average fraction of the maximal gains of 
trade which were actually realized in both treatments and for both institutions. In 
DRS the double auction realizes on average 95.8% of the maximum possible gains 
of trade, whereas in PO realized gains are only 71.2%. The difference is highly sig-
nificant (WSR, z = 3.408 , p < 0.001 ). In CRS, DA realizes 98.1% of all possible 
gains, while in PO realized gains are only 83.5%. Again, the difference is highly 
significant (WSR, z = 3.408 , p < 0.001 ). Realized gains are higher in CRS than in 
DRS both for DA (MWU, z = −4.500 , p < 0.001 ) and for PO (MWU, z = −2.344 , 
p = 0.019).
In summary, we find that DA is able to realize a larger fraction of the maximal 
gains of trade than PO in both treatments, coming very close to the theoretical maxi-
mum. However, the difference is larger in the DRS treatment. To see this, we com-
pare the difference in differences and find that the relative advantage of DA over PO 
is larger in DRS (24.0%) compared to CRS (14.6%; MWU, z = 1.970 , p = 0.049).
5.2  The Distribution of Gains from Trade
The previous subsection has examined efficiency at the level of an institution. In 
this subsection, we briefly compare the gains from trade separately for buyers 
and sellers, which illuminates the underlying dynamics. Figure  6 displays the 
per capita gains from actual trade over time in both treatments and both institu-
tions, separately for buyers and for sellers (that is, the figure plots total gains of 
a market side divided by the number of actually-present traders from that side, 
averaged across active markets). Whereas in DRS the gains from trade remain of 
a comparable magnitude for both market sides and for each given market insti-
tution, with sellers sightly above buyers, in CRS a large gap opens in DA, with 
buyers’ gains steadily rising while those from sellers decline (the average dif-
ference between per capita buyers’ and sellers’ gains is -2.0 ECUs in part 1 and 
Table 5  Regressions for comparison DRS vs CRS in first and last part
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Number of buyers at DA Number of sellers at DA
Rounds 2-9 Rounds 18-25 Rounds 2-9 Rounds 18-25
Period 0.1536∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗ 0.1849∗∗∗ 0.0278
(0.0351) (0.0178) (0.0412) (0.0268)
CRS −0.6583 −0.4500 −0.5167 −1.1000∗∗
(0.4058) (0.4318) (0.4146) (0.4613)
Constant 5.3554∗∗∗ 6.5484∗∗∗ 4.8746∗∗∗ 6.6528∗∗∗
(0.3550) (0.4677) (0.3593) (0.6150)
R
2 (overall) 0.0864 0.0346 0.0752 0.1238
Observations 240 240 240 240
Markets 30 30 30 30
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52.9 in part 3; WSR, z = −3.408 , p < 0.001 ). This gap also exists but is smaller 
in the case of PO (the corresponding average difference in part 3 for PO is 21.6, 
which is smaller than the one of DA; WSR, z = −2.840 , p = 0.005).
The interpretation is as follows. Over time, more traders move toward the 
double auction institution (Fig. 3, top-right). In this institution, provided enough 
sellers are present, the price should converge to market clearing, which under 
constant returns to scale implies zero profits for the sellers (Fig. 4, right). Con-
vergence, however, takes time, and even more so in a setting where traders can 
switch away from a given institution. This means that profits remain positive for 
sellers even as more of them them flock to the double auction institution and the 
price in the latter drops. Hence, even as the price becomes relatively close to 
marginal cost and buyers’ are able to reap larger and larger shares of the gains 
from trade, the institution remains comparatively attractive for sellers. Sellers 





































































Fig. 4  Average (over 15 markets) of the differences between average realized prices and the equilibrium 























































Fig. 5  Average (over 15 markets) realized gains (as fraction of maximal possible gains) at PO vs. DA per 
period
1 3
Do traders learn to select efficient market institutions? 
is gradually becoming empty, and a more efficient institution (DA) where their 
profits might eventually vanish but remain positive within a finite horizon.
6  Results: Switching Behavior
In this section we look at individual behavior regarding market selection. In par-
ticular, we look at market switching behavior, that is, the traders’ decision whether 
to leave the market they are currently at and select the other market for the next 
period.24 A (market) switch is a market choice where a subject selects a market for 
the next round that is different from the market he is currently at. A total of 19.8% of 
all market-choice decisions were switches, 21.1% in the case of sellers and 18.4% in 
the case of buyers (obviously excluding the first period).
The previous literature on experimental markets has often looked at simple 
behavioral rules of thumb (e.g., imitation or myopic best reply) within single mar-
kets. In particular, and following the theoretical model of Vega-Redondo (1997), a 
series of experimental Cournot oligopoly markets examined the role of imitation in 

















































































































































Fig. 6  Average (over active markets) gains of buyers and sellers per period
24 The analysis of individual-level trading decisions conditional on a selected market could run into 
endogeneity issues. This is not a concern here, because in this section we concentrate on the decision of 
which market to choose, and not on subsequent trading decisions given that choice.
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function and all subjects play the role of producers. Those experiments generally 
found evidence in favor of imitative rules when information was centered on indi-
vidual actions and profits, with possible shifts toward more forward-looking rules 
as myopic best reply when more information on the market structure was provided 
(e.g., Huck et al. 1999; Offerman et al. 2002; Apesteguía et al. 2007, 2010), although 
results depend on the number of players, the length of the experiment, and other fac-
tors (Bosch-Domènech and Vriend 2003; Huck et  al. 2004; Friedman et  al. 2015; 
Oechssler et  al. 2016). For instance, Huck et  al. (2002) suggested that their data 
would be consistent with a mixture of best reply and imitation. Those experiments, 
however, all consider production behavior within a single market institution. The 
exception is Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger (2015), who conducted an experiment on 
platform selection where, however, actual trade followed a reduced-form approach 
(that is, traders did not make actual trading decisions). Alós-Ferrer and Kirchsteiger 
(2015) found evidence in favor of switching behavior reflecting which institutions 
had the maximum observed payoffs for the trader’s market side, which can be seen 
as a form of imitation.
Following this literature, we hypothesized that simple rules of thumb would be 
able to explain switching behavior in our data.25 We consider three behavioral rules 
that specify switches of a particular type depending on different (observable) market 
outcomes. A buyer (seller) following a Best-Price rule chooses the institution with 
lowest (highest) observed price in the current period, effectively chasing after the 
best observed price. To prevent trivial cases, the rule also prescribes to avoid institu-
tions where no trade occurred, hence no price was realized. A buyer (seller) follow-
ing a Best-Average-Price rule chooses the institution with the lowest (highest) aver-
age price in the current period, hence taking into account that a single price might 
not be representative of the institution (trivial cases are avoided as in Best-Price). A 
more forward-looking rule is to focus on the trader ratio as a predictor of future per-
formance. In particular, in our setting, the equilibrium market price is a function of 
the trader ratio, and hence focusing on the latter could be seen as an attempt to pre-
dict the former, and in this sense this rule is closer to myopic best reply. A buyer fol-
lowing a Best-Ratio rule chooses the institution with lowest ratio of buyers to sellers 
in the current period (and follows the sellers if they are all at the same institution). 
Analogously, a seller following this rule chooses the institution with lowest ratio of 
sellers to buyers in the current period (and follows the buyers if they are all at the 
same institution).26
25 The link to imitation is particularly interesting, because certain forms of this behavioral rule (Schlag 
1998; Alós-Ferrer and Schlag 2009) give rise to aggregate-level dynamics closely related to the well-
known replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory (see Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998, Chapter 8). 
This link, however, has rarely been made explicit for the case of market selection. An exception is Rud 
and Rabanal (2018), who conduct a simulation analysis of market selection with trader heterogeneity 
relying on individual-level replicator dynamics to determine the time allocation across different market 
types.
26 Note that the highest price and the highest average price are displayed explicitly in the market selec-
tion stage, whereas the ratio of buyers to sellers is not shown explicitly but can be computed fairly easily 
as both the number of buyers and sellers at each institution is shown on screen.
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The upper part of Table 6 shows the percentage of decisions that are consistent 
with each rule’s prescriptions, in addition to the percentage of switching decisions, 
separately for buyers and sellers. All three rules explain a large percentage of deci-
sions, with the simplest one, BestPrice, explaining the most both for buyers (81.0%) 
and for sellers (75.1%), but with the most sophisticated, BestRatio, coming close 
for sellers (74.3%). As decision inertia might explain a part of the non-switching 
decisions, the lower part of the table shows the fraction of switches that are con-
sistent with following each rule, separately for trader type and treatment. BestRatio 
explains most switches (between 73.3% and 78.6%) for both trader types and in both 
treatments.
Given these results, we further analyze the predictive power of BestPrice and 
BestRatio in a series of random effects probit regressions (Tables  7 and 8). The 
dependent variable is switching behavior (a dummy variable taking the value 1 if there 
was a switch), but the regressors are continuous variables reflecting the price or ratio 
differences. The regression hence considers stochastic versions of the rules where a 
switch is more likely the larger the price difference (or ratio difference) is. The differ-
ence in the best price is coded as the difference between the currently chosen institu-
tion and the other institution for buyers and conversely for sellers. The difference in 
ratios is coded as the difference in buyer-seller ratios between the current institution 
and the other one for buyers, and the analogous difference in seller-buyer ratios for 
sellers. To avoid the natural (nonlinear) asymmetry of ratios (all ratios toward one side 
are condensed between 0 and 1, while ratios toward the other side are in principle 
unbounded), we consider the logarithm of the ratio. Last, to make the coefficients of 
the different rules comparable, we divide each of the two resulting variables by their 
respective empirical standard deviation.27 We remark that price differences and log 
of ratios are undefined if either institution is empty in a given period and hence the 
regressions must exclude those observations. However, in those cases all rules would 
make the same prediction, thus they play no role to compare the rules (the regressions, 
however, underestimate the predictive power of the rules for that reason).
The regressions show that both BestPrice and BestRatio are predictive of switches 
for both trader types if considered separately. However, when taken together, in the 
case of buyers only BestPrice remains significant. That is, buyer behavior appears 
to be usefully summarized by chasing after low prices. In contrast, for sellers both 
rules remain significantly predictive when considered jointly. That is, sellers seem 
to take into account both past high prices and favorable trader ratios, suggesting a 
stronger focus on forward-looking evaluations. Notably, this observation holds for 
both treatments, DRS and CRS.28
27 That is, we essentially standardize the difference variables, dividing the values by the standard devia-
tion in the 30 × 24 dataset containing the price and trader-ratio differences in the experiment. We do not 
subtract the empirical mean because the value zero has a specific meaning (same prices or same ratios in 
both institutions).
28 The Online Appendix (Tables A.4 and A.5) reports a robustness analysis controlling for the institution 
that a trader was at in the previous period. All previous conclusions remain unchanged, but the results 
also suggest that BestPrice remains predictive independently of the institution, while BestRatio is predic-
tive only for traders who were at DA. That is, traders who just traded in a posted offers setting focus on 
prices but not on buyer-seller ratios.
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Table 6  Consistent decisions and consistent switches
Notes BestPrice, BestAvgPrice, BestRatio indicate that institution with best price, best average price (for 
own market side), or best buyer/seller ratio, respectively, was chosen. Consistent switches are switches in 
line with the respective rule
Switches Consistent decisions
BestPrice BestAvgPrice BestRatio
Seller 21.1% 75.1% 69.4% 74.3%
Buyer 18.4% 81.0% 77.7% 67.2%
Consistent switches BestPrice BestAvgPrice BestRatio
DRS CRS DRS CRS DRS CRS
Seller 61.9% 62.4% 63.6% 65.7% 77.1% 78.6%
Buyer 59.0% 59.6% 62.1% 66.5% 76.9% 73.3%
Table 7  Random effect probit regression on switches for buyers
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Switch DRS CRS
1 2 3 4 5 6
DiffBestPrice 0.268∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.038) (0.041)
DiffLogRatio 0.197∗∗∗ 0.006 0.148∗∗∗ −0.016
(0.041) (0.046) (0.035) (0.040)
Period −0.032∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant −0.229∗∗∗ −0.396∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗ −0.293∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.095) (0.091) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081)
Observations 1350 1406 1350 1873 1929 1873
Table 8  Random effect probit regression on switches for sellers
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Switch DRS CRS
1 2 3 4 5 6
DiffBestPrice 0.243∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.039) (0.033) (0.038)
DiffLogRatio 0.278∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.048) (0.032) (0.038)
Period −0.044∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant −0.375∗∗∗ −0.497∗∗∗ −0.448∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗ −0.353∗∗∗ −0.308∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.089) (0.091) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
Observations 1349 1405 1349 1877 1933 1877
1 3
Do traders learn to select efficient market institutions? 
The striking asymmetry in behavioral drivers between buyers and sellers is natu-
ral. In principle, in DA and under decreasing returns to scale, both trader types are 
treated symmetrically. However, PO is biased in favor of the sellers, and buyers are 
essentially passive in this latter institution. Thus, there is an institutional asymmetry 
which creates a tradeoff for sellers which is absent for the case of buyers. On the 
one hand, sellers would like to reap the high profits associated with larger prices 
typical of PO. On the other hand, the inefficiency of the latter institution attracts less 
buyers, thus leading to worse ratios for the sellers. This also holds empirically for 
constant returns to scale, even though in this case coordination on DA would make 
the sellers’ profits disappear entirely. The latter observation is less surprising in view 
of previous sections, since the slow speed of convergence guarantees that profits in 
DA, although dwindling, remain positive for sellers.
It is also interesting to note that previous empirical work on experimental mar-
kets (within a fixed institution, and with respect to trading behavior) has often sug-
gested behavioral heterogeneity, with some subjects relying more on imitative rules 
and others on myopic best reply (Huck et  al. 1999, 2002), or behavior reflecting 
more or less sophisticated rules depending on available information (Offerman et al. 
2002). In our markets, all traders have the same information, and they are randomly 
allocated to the role of buyers or sellers. Thus, the difference in behavior that we 
observe between buyers and sellers is causally induced by their different roles (and, 
specifically, the presence of an institution which treats them differently), and does 
not arise from cognitive or informational differences.
7  Conclusion
Most goods can be traded in different market institutions or platforms. The econom-
ics literature has intensively studied trading when the market institution is fixed, but 
market selection has received comparatively little attention. We study both, market 
selection itself, and how the presence of alternative institutions affects trade. We 
pit a double-auction environment, where buyers and sellers can freely trade without 
an auctioneer, against a posted-offers institution, where buyers are constrained to 
accept or reject the offers made by sellers. Although the former has been empirically 
shown to induce quick convergence to market clearing in isolation, the latter embod-
ies a bias in favor of the sellers, and thus efficiency arguments suggest that traders 
should learn to coordinate on the double auction.
We observe coordination toward the double-auction institution, which is faster 
when sellers face decreasing returns to scale compared to when they are endowed 
with constant per-unit production costs. That is, under decreasing returns to scale, 
traders learn to coordinate on the efficient double auction, and the posted-offers insti-
tution becomes inactive in finitely many rounds. In contrast, under constant returns 
to scale, although traders tend to concentrate on the double auction, both institutions 
remain active until the last round. The reason is that, in the latter case, sellers try to 
stave off (but ultimately are not able to prevent) coordination in the double auction 
and the resulting convergence to market clearing prices (which would leave them 
with no profits).
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Within institutions, and even though traders might “jump boat” at any point, trad-
ing behavior approaches equilibrium predictions in terms of prices and gains of 
trade. Switching behavior across institutions, however, can be explained by simple 
rules of thumb. Those are different across trader types: buyers seem to simply chase 
after low observed prices, while sellers consider both high observed prices and 
trader ratios. The latter might be seen as a myopic predictor of future market prices 
and hence reveal a more forward-looking mindset. Because traders were randomly 
allocated to the roles of buyers or sellers, the differences in behavior were causally 
induced.
Our work empirically demonstrates that efficiency alone might not suffice for a 
market institution to drive competing ones out of the field. Under decreasing returns 
to scale, fast coordination occurs because the double auction Pareto dominates the 
alternative, in the sense that both trader types can reap larger gains from trade. 
Under constant returns to scale, gains from trade are monopolized by buyers, and 
sellers’ earnings approach zero as prices approach the market clearing level. Thus, 
the distribution of gains from trade is unequal and sellers do not benefit from coordi-
nation on the efficient institution. Although, in our data, this translated into a slow-
down of convergence, in general one might speculate that once profits become small 
enough, sellers might, in some cases and for some parameter constellations, success-
fully manage to turn the tide and preserve biased, inefficient institutions in the mar-
ket. This might contribute to explain why multiple, possibly-inefficient institutions 
typically coexist for single, given goods in actual markets.
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